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发布时间:2014-11-05 浏览量:10

报告题目Multi-Path Routing and Forwarding in Non-Cooperative Wireless Networks

报告人Sammy Chan  副教授

主持人:何道敬 教授

开始时间20141110 13:30

讲座地址:中北校区数学馆201

主办单位:上海市高可信计算重点实验室

 

报告人简介:

Sammy Chan received his B.E. and M.Eng.Sc. degrees in electrical engineering from the University of Melbourne, Australia, in 1988 and 1990, respectively, and a Ph.D. degree in communication engineering from the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Australia, in 1995. From 1989 to 1994, he was with Telecom Australia Research Laboratories, first as a research engineer, and between 1992 and 1994 as a senior research engineer and project leader. Since December 1994, he has been with the Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, where he is currently an associate professor.  His past research interests include congestion control and switch architecture for ATM networks, handoff techniques and data link protocols for mobile networks, optimal file placement in video-on-demand services, and TCP over wireless networks. Recently, his research focus on resource allocation and routing in ad hoc networks, and network security.

 

报告摘要:

Multi-path routing and forwarding in non-cooperative networks is extremely challenging due to the co-existence of both rational and Byzantine nodes. They both might deviate from the protocol; however, their intentions and behaviors are totally different. Rational nodes aim to maximize their utilities, while Byzantine nodes purposefully deviate from the protocol to disrupt the normal operation of a network. Most work in the literature treat both kinds of misbehavior without distinction and thus lead to ineffective solutions. In this talk, we present a hybrid design that seamlessly integrates mechanisms for different misbehavior in a unified framework. The generalized second price (GSP) auction provides incentives for rational nodes to cooperate and results in truth-telling Nash equilibria. With the possible inclusion of Byzantine nodes in the least cost paths selected by GSP, the FORBID mechanism builds a decentralized reputation system such that malicious behavior is effectively detected. This in turn triggers the GSP auction to update the least cost paths so as to exclude the malicious nodes from being selected for communication. It is proved that the unified protocol is cooperation-optimal.

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